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ABSTRACT: In the economic literature various political institutions designed to control the 
government have been analyzed. However, an important institution has been neglected so far: 
independent auditing institutions with an extended mandate to analyze the budget draft and 
individual policy proposals. We argue that auditors with an extended mandate improve 
transparency and provide essential information on the impact of policy proposals on common pool 
resources. This leads to less wasteful spending and a more efficient allocation of public resources. 
We empirically analyze the policy impact of local auditors with an extended audit mandate in 
Switzerland. Auditors, who can evaluate and criticize policy proposals ex ante to policy decisions, 
significantly reduce the general tax burden and public expenditures. We find similar results with 
different datasets. These results are robust to various changes in the econometric specification. 
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RESUMEN: En la literatura económica se han analizado varias instituciones políticas diseñadas 
para controlar el gobierno. Sin embargo, una importante institución se ha ignorado hasta ahora: las 
instituciones auditoras independientes con poder ampliado para analizar el proyecto presupuestario 
y propuestas políticas individuales. En este trabajo se argumenta que los auditores con un poder 
ampliado mejoran la transparencia y proporcionan información esencial sobre el impacto de las 
propuestas de política económica en los recursos comunes compartidos. Esto comporta una mejor 
utilización del gasto y una más eficiente asignación de los recursos públicos. En este papel se 
analiza empíricamente el impacto, en las políticas, de los auditores locales con un poder ampliado 
para auditar en Suiza. Los auditores, quienes pueden evaluar y criticar las propuestas de política 
económica ex ante a las decisiones políticas, reducen significativamente el gravamen general de 
los impuestos y el gasto público. En este trabajo se obtienen resultados similares con bases de 
datos diferentes. Estos resultados son robustos ante diferentes cambios en la especificación 
econométrica. 
 
Palabras clave: Auditor, tribunal de cuentas, intereses especiales, economía política, hacienda 
pública. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In mature democracies fundamental rules such as the separation of powers and regular elections 
have been established. They nevertheless suffer from the asymmetric influence of special 
interest groups, pork barrel politics, and the regular overuse of common pool resources. One of 
the fundamental problems is the collective action problem and the asymmetry between interest 
groups to articulate and provide information about their preferences. Thus, special interests are 
often able to obtain rents at the expense of the general public. Even though various institutional 
mechanisms have been discussed to mitigate these problems, an important institution has been 
neglected so far: independent public auditors with an ex ante audit mandate. 
 
Traditional auditors typically analyze the financial statements provided by the government and 
evaluate the use of public funds. All developed democracies feature some form of supreme 
auditing institution. Usually, these audit offices are fairly large: the German Bundesrechungshof 
and its associated offices employ more than 1400 individuals and the US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has a budget of roughly half a billion USD. These audit 
institutions are widely seen as being an important instrument to hold government officials 
accountable. However, they usually only targeted at bookkeeping procedures and evaluations of 
policy implementation, that is, after decisions have been made in the political process. 
Therefore, these ex post audits often come too late, because decisions have already been made 
and the budget or specific policies have been implemented. In contrast to what is audited in 
these ex post audits, most budgetary ‘tricks’ are adopted ex ante to decisions and are, hence, not 
subject to an auditor’s evaluation. 
 
We argue that the audit mandate of public auditing institutions has an important impact on 
policy outcome. In addition to the standard ex post audit of the accounts and the performance of 
policy programs, auditors should analyze the fundamentals of the budget draft and evaluate 
individual policy proposals. The additional information provided by such a powerful auditing 
institution strengthens common pool interests, improves transparency, and reduces the overuse 
of common pool resources. 
 
We test our hypotheses by analyzing a unique institutional setting in Switzerland where some 
local auditing institutions are actively involved during the policy making process. They cannot 
only evaluate programs ex post to the implementation, but also evaluate policy proposals ex 
ante to the political decision and report their findings to the public. Some institutions are even 
allowed to make counterproposals, which are then voted on by the citizens. We construct a 
measure capturing the relevant aspects of the design of local auditing institution and provide 
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empirical evidence highlighting the importance of such powerful auditors. We estimate their 
influence on fiscal variables such as public expenditures and taxes. We consistently find that 
more powerful auditors significantly reduce taxes and expenditures. 
 
In Section 2 we provide the main arguments to extend audit competences beyond traditional ex 
post audits to include substantial ex ante audits. We then discuss some details of the institutional 
design for such a new type of auditing institution and formulate testable hypotheses. Section 3 
introduces the test case in Switzerland and provides details on the institutional design of local 
auditors and the codification of the index capturing the auditor mandate. The presentation of the 
datasets and a discussion of the empirical identification strategy including our various 
approaches to deal with potential endogeneity follow in Section 4. In Section 5 we present our 
empirical results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
2.1. Extending the Audit Mandate: From Ex Post to Ex Ante Audits 
 
Public auditing institutions aim at reducing the agency problem between citizens and the 
government by reviewing financial information. Such independent review of financial 
statements is important because disclosure requirements of financial information are only 
effective if the information provided is accurate and timely (see Schelker 2007). Standard public 
auditing institutions analyze financial statements and evaluate government performance in order 
to improve transparency and reduce information asymmetries between citizens and their 
government. From this perspective an important line of research related to our question focuses 
on the impact of budgetary transparency on fiscal outcomes (e.g. von Hagen 1992, Alesina and 
Perotti 1996, Ferejohn 1999, Milesi-Ferretti 2004, and Alt and Lassen 2006). 
 
Traditional auditing institutions typically conduct ex post audits of the financial statements and 
evaluate bookkeeping procedures for accuracy and accordance with accounting rules and 
regulations. Some also conduct ex post evaluations of programs and policy implementation, i.e. 
performance audits. Recent contributions analyzing the impact of independent ex post financial 
audits on waste and corruption (e.g. Olken 2007, Ferraz and Finan 2005), and the influence of 
ex post performance audits on various measures of government performance (Schelker 2007) 
suggest that these audits have favorable effects on the workings of government. However, ex 
post audits have the great disadvantage that they cannot evaluate the allocation of public funds, 
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since the audits are conducted after the decisions in the policy process have been made and after 
the resources have been spent. Consequently, the traditional perspective on auditors is confined 
to the ex post control of government agents and does not address a major problem in the 
policymaking process, which is the asymmetric influence of organized special interests. 
 
Special interests are able to inform policymakers about their preferred policies, while at the 
same time broad-based interests cannot articulate in the policy process. Large groups can 
typically not overcome the free-rider problem and are hence, not or only weakly organized 
(Olson 1965, and e.g. Lohmann 1998). Therefore, efficiency-oriented common pool interests 
(e.g. taxpayers) are underrepresented in the policymaking process. One of the direct 
implications is that special interest groups tend to formulate policies that do not internalize the 
full cost because the benefits of these policies target a narrow group while the cost are spread 
over all of society. Hence, policies that benefit specific groups but are financed out of the 
common pool tend to be sub-optimally large.1 At the same time such policy proposals are not 
critically evaluated if only the unorganized common pool interest is directly affected. 
 
This asymmetry manifests in the entire budget process. There is ample evidence that the 
fundamental information underlying the budgetary draft (e.g. revenue, growth, or inflation 
forecasts) can be biased (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1996, Milesi-Ferretti 2004, Wallack 2007). 
Similarly, the corner stones of individual policy projects are easily influenced. Examples are 
cost and revenue estimates, the forecasts of future demand for, and the necessary capacity of 
public infrastructure such as highways, railways, and tunnels, depreciation rates, maintenance 
costs, etc. Hence, the reported details of individual policy propositions might not accurately 
reflect the necessity of the project and its actual impact on common pool resources. All this 
fundamental information is prone to bias and, at the same time, individual voters and 
policymakers have no or only weak incentives to invest in careful analyses of the budget and 
new proposals. 
 
Independent auditors could fill this gap by auditing and evaluating the fundamental economic 
assumptions and financial implications underlying the budget draft and individual policy 
projects. The freely accessible information from such ex ante audits could substantially reduce 
                                                 
1 The structure of the argument is similar to the ones made by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson (1981) and 
von Hagen and Harden (1995). Von Hagen and Harden (1995) argue that the beneficiaries of a certain 
policy do not internalize the full cost of such policies because they are financed out of the common pool. 
The authors specifically focus on the difference between spending ministers targeting their spending 
towards a specific constituency, and the Minister of Finance, who is assumed to give more weight to the 
collective interest of the government. Hence, spending ministers tend to favor higher than optimal 
government spending. 
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the information asymmetry, and improve transparency and the quality of information relevant 
for policy decisions. 
 
So far we assumed that the auditing institution actually reveal essential and accurate 
information. Obviously, we need to ask why auditors are not captured by and do not collude 
with special interests. In this section we briefly outline some mechanisms that help keeping the 
auditor independent and committed to his task. 
 
First, auditors need to have a clearly defined mission to assess the budget and policy 
propositions from a financial perspective and to transmit the audit results to the principal. A 
clearly defined mission makes it easier to observe and evaluate an auditor’s performance (for a 
general discussion see e.g. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole 1999). 
 
Secondly, auditors should not have voting rights or any authority to introduce sanctions nor co-
decision rights. This prevents auditors from directly engaging in log-rolling and restricts their 
influence in the decision-making process to consulting, more specifically the production of 
information. Hence, auditors are, compared to traditional policymakers, less attractive targets 
for lobbyists and the opportunities to extract rents from the office are much smaller. 
 
Thirdly, auditors have to be given incentives to cater to broad-based interests. The direct 
election of public officials enhances their accountability to the voters (Frey 1994, Besley and 
Coate 2003, and more generally Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997). This is especially 
important since auditors with an extended ex ante audit mandate might be in conflict with 
interests of members of the legislative and the executive. Therefore, auditors may not be 
appointed by the agents it ought to supervise, but directly by the principal, the citizens and 
taxpayers of the entire jurisdiction who collectively have an interest in sound financial analysis.2 
The separate election of auditors and policymakers makes it possible for voters to unbundle 
their special interests from the more general common pool interests they share with other 
taxpayers. If auditors are directly elected electoral rules must be considered. In order that 
auditors pursue broad-based interests and focus on allocative efficiency rather than on specific 
interests and redistribution they have to be elected in majority votes in a single jurisdiction-wide 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed discussion of the relevant literature and empirical evidence for the case of regular 
auditing institutions see Schelker (2007). The empirical analysis of the selection mechanisms of US State 
Auditors suggests that auditors with more substantial (ex post) audit competences should be directly 
elected rather than appointed. In our setting auditors are endowed with an even broader set of tasks and 
competences including ex ante audits, which makes direct election even more important. For a general 
discussions of whether public officials should be appointed or elected see e.g. Ferejohn (1999), Besley 
and Coate (2003), and Maskin and Tirole (2004).  
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district. Auditors elected in a single jurisdiction-wide district must seek support from all over 
the jurisdiction, which ensures broad-based interest representation.3  
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
 
Based on our previous discussions we can formulate hypotheses. If auditors have a stronger 
audit mandate including the evaluation of the budget draft and individual policy projects, the 
quality of the information underlying the budget draft as well as information on the financial 
and fiscal impact of proposed policies will be revealed. This reduces the information asymmetry 
between special interests and broad-based common pool interests fostering the overuse of 
common pool resources. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
 
A more extensive audit mandate including a full set of ex ante audit competences should 
(cet. par.) reduce general expenditures and taxes. 
 
In a regression framework we estimate the following general specification and expect the 
estimated effect of auditors (β) to result in a negative coefficient. 
 
y = α + β * auditor + δ * I + λ * X + ε, (1) 
 
where y is a variable reflecting fiscal outcome such as e.g. government expenditures, or taxes, 
and auditor is a variable capturing the auditor mandate and involvement in the policy process. 
Furthermore, δ and λ are parameter vectors, I is a matrix reflecting additional institutional 
features influencing the decision-making process, X is a matrix including important cross-
section characteristics, and ε is the error term. 
 
Our theoretical arguments make it possible to derive a differential hypothesis. This is especially 
important since this helps corroborating our theoretical considerations and attenuate possible 
concerns relating to endogeneity. 
 
                                                 
3 More on electoral rules and district size see e.g. Baqir (2002), Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno 
(2002), or Persson and Tabellini (2004).  
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Since free-rider and collective action problems become more pronounced with increasing group 
size, we expect the organization problem of common pool interests to be more pronounced in 
larger relative to smaller jurisdictions. This leads us to formulate our next hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
 
The influence of an extensive audit mandate should (cet. par.) be stronger in larger 
relative to smaller jurisdictions. 
 
Thus, we estimate a specification including an interaction term between the population size of a 
jurisdiction and the auditor variable. We expect both β and γ to be negative. 
 
y = α + β * auditor + γ * (population size * auditor) + δ * I + λ * X + ε (2) 
 
We test these hypotheses empirically with data at the Swiss local level, where in some 
jurisdictions auditors have substantial ex ante audit mandates. 
 
 
3. Auditors in Switzerland 
 
3.1. The Swiss research laboratory 
 
Switzerland and the United States share some important institutional characteristics that make 
them well suited for empirical research for at least two reasons: 1) Both exhibit highly 
decentralized government structures, with different government levels enjoying a high degree of 
autonomy. The Swiss federal structure consists of 3 hierarchical government layers: the federal 
government (the Confederation), the 26 Cantons (the States) and the 2880 municipalities, which 
all enjoy a high degree of autonomy and independently take a wide range of political decisions 
(Ladner 1994, Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger 2003). Therefore, we observe considerable 
variation in the institutional design across jurisdictions. 2) A further important element of the 
US and (even more pronounced) the Swiss government structures is that citizens enjoy various 
direct democratic participation rights such as different forms of referenda and initiatives. Note 
that not all cantons feature the same participation rights (Stutzer 1999 and Feld and Matsusaka 
2003). These direct democratic rights are an important characteristic because they allow the 
evolution of institutions that more effectively control representatives. In contrast, policymakers 
themselves have typically no incentives to implement institutions that effectively restrict their 
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own scope of action. The decentralized structure makes policy and institutional experiments in a 
common (e.g. national) framework possible, while direct democratic rights enhance the 
probability for creating new institutions, but at the same time provides an effective mechanism 
to abort failed experiments. These and other institutional features make the Swiss case an 
attractive laboratory to conduct empirical research. Of course, cross-country research often 
features much more institutional variation. However, the common institutional framework 
substantially reduces the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, and thus, diminishes omitted 
variable bias (see also Besley and Case 2003). 
 
The municipal revenue and expenditure shares almost equal the shares of the federal 
government. All the three government levels primarily finance their needs with their own taxes 
and user charges. The cantons as well as the municipalities rely heavily on direct taxes (around 
95% of total tax revenue), whereas the federal government relies much more on indirect taxes 
(around 60% of total federal tax revenue) such as the VAT. The cantons and the municipalities 
levy the major part of direct income taxes, although the federal government also raises its own 
(highly progressive) income tax. The extent of the total income tax burden (including cantonal, 
municipal, and church taxes) varies considerably across cantons. 
 
3.2. Local auditors in Switzerland 
 
The Swiss institutional setting makes it possible to study the impact of auditors with an 
extended audit mandate. Independent local auditors, the so called local finance commissions, 
exist in all municipalities with town meeting.4 Note that more than 50 percent of the total Swiss 
population lives in such municipalities. In this setting citizens elect the government as well as an 
audit body, the finance commission. In the town meeting the government presents its policy 
proposals for the following period, while the auditors may analyze the government proposals 
and may be permitted to provide information and present counterproposal. 
 
The cantonal legislation on municipalities defines the basic institutional design of these 
auditors, but still leaves the municipalities some autonomy in the de facto design. However, 
                                                 
4 We only consider communities with town meetings, because only in this institutional setting is the 
auditor really independent. In parliamentary systems the finance commission is an ordinary legislative 
committee (e.g. Weingast and Marshall 1988 or Shepsle and Weingast 1994), an exception being some 
larger Swiss cities. In e.g. Zug and Olten (both featuring parliaments) the finance commission is an 
independent and directly elected body. However, these units only conduct the ex post audit of the 
accounts, similar to regular audit courts and cannot conduct any ex ante audits. 
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while the intra-cantonal differences are very small, the inter-cantonal variation is large.5 In some 
cantons the auditors can only audit the accounts and similar to an audit court, criticize the 
government at the end of a fiscal year (ex post). In other cantons, however, auditors are 
involved in the actual policy making process and have encompassing ex ante audit competences 
as well as proposal and amendment rights. In addition to the standard ex post audit of the 
accounts, they can ex ante evaluate the budget proposal, individual investment projects, as well 
as the income tax rate and all other sources of income. To transmit the resulting information 
from the auditing process, auditors compile a report with the results of their analysis, announce 
their recommendation whether to support or to oppose the government proposal, and some are 
even allowed to advance amendments and alternative proposals. Thereafter, citizens choose in a 
majority vote between the status quo and the different proposals and delegate the policy 
implementation to the government. 
 
All local auditors are directly elected by the citizens in a jurisdiction wide district. The office 
has a clear mandate that is specified by local and cantonal laws and regulations, and it requires 
specific audit skills. Hence, we often find auditing or accounting professionals in the audit 
office. Compared to a mandate in an executive position, the audit mandate is less time 
consuming, and professional auditing know how can be transferred from the private sector to 
political office quite easily. Auditors are usually not career politicians, serve only as auditor, 
and do not subsequently run for an executive office. Local auditors have neither voting rights 
nor the power to implement their own proposals and, hence, they do not exercise any direct 
influence on the political outcome. These features are important in order to keep the audit office 
independent from other political offices. 
 
It is essential to identify whether local auditors tend to be captured by special interests or not. 
From our many discussions with municipal auditors and experts from cantonal authorities 
responsible for monitoring the municipalities and from our survey evidence of the canton of 
Zurich, we are confident that auditor independence is strong and the selection of individuals in 
the finance commissions is different from regular political offices.6 The available evidence 
                                                 
5 Even though cantons frequently leave some autonomy in the de facto design to the municipalities, they 
often provide some general (non-binding) guidelines on how to organize the local auditing commission. 
Therefore, we observe extensive homogeneity across municipalities in a canton. However, one canton, the 
Canton of Zurich, shows at least some variation across municipalities. We have conducted a systematic 
survey of all municipal auditors in that canton. Descriptive statistics and some initial results from this 
dataset (Megert 2006), point in the same direction as the empirical evidence provided in the subsequent 
sections.  
 
6 For an overview of some more systematic evidence on the Canton of Zurich, see Megert (2006) who 
conducted a survey of local auditors in the Canton of Zurich. The Canton of Zurich is a good example, 
because most finance commissions are involved in the policy process and they are endowed with 
substantial ex ante audit rights. A brief summary of the relevant insights can be found in Schelker (2007). 
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points towards a different selection of the members of the local finance commissions. While 
financial expertise is important for members in the local audit offices, the traditionally strong 
local interest groups such as farmers and local business representatives are relatively 
underrepresented in municipal finance commissions. 
 
3.3. ‘Quantifying’ auditor influence: The finance commission index 
 
To measure the scope of the audit mandate we constructed an index that captures the 
institutional design of the local finance commission for the 26 cantons. The intra-cantonal 
design is relatively homogenous, whereas the inter-cantonal variation is important. In order to 
identify the de facto design, we first analyzed the (de jure) cantonal legislation on 
municipalities; then we investigated whether the municipalities made de facto use of the 
opportunities offered by cantonal law (see Schelker 2002 and Schelker and Eichenberger 2003). 
In summary, auditors may have the following competences and proposal rights: 
 
1. Audit competences 
• Ex post audit of the accounts 
• Ex post audit of individual projects 
• Ex ante audit and evaluation of the budget proposal 
• Ex ante audit and evaluation of individual projects 
2. Proposal rights (directly to the citizens) 
• Recommendation with respect to the government proposition (acceptance/rejection) 
• Right to advance alternative propositions 
 
The audit competences define the item to be audited and at what moment the audit takes place 
(before or after implementation). The “Ex post audit of the accounts” is the regular audit 
procedure in which the auditor examines the reliability of the accounts and their compliance 
with general accounting standards. In the “Ex post audit of individual projects” the auditor 
analyzes individual projects by evaluating the effectiveness of its implementation and 
identifying any misuse of public funds. In the “Ex ante audit and evaluation of budget proposal” 
the auditor evaluates the budget proposal’s compliance with accounting standards and evaluates 
the soundness of the budget proposal and if it is appropriate to the financial situation of the 
jurisdiction. In the “Ex ante audit and evaluation of individual projects” the commission 
evaluates individual investment projects before they are adopted and implemented. In order to 
effectively bring the extracted information into the political process, auditors may have 
recommendation and amendment rights.  
10
We code each aspect with 1 (available) or 0 (not available) and aggregate them to the “finance 
commission index”. We exclude “Ex post audit of the accounts” and “Recommendation with 
respect to the government proposition (acceptance/rejection)” from our index because all 
auditors feature these competences (for details see Table A1 of the Appendix, or Eichenberger, 
Schelker 2007). 
 
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
As a consequence of the extensive decentralization of Switzerland, the cantons are responsible 
for the collection of most of the data of interest to us. Unfortunately, not all cantons use the 
same criteria, rules, and definitions when assembling the data. Therefore, comparable data is 
frequently only available as an aggregate of cantonal and municipal data at the cantonal but not 
at the municipal level. It is important to note, that not all cantons grant their municipalities the 
same fiscal autonomy and the division of duties and responsibilities between cantons and their 
municipalities are not necessarily similar. Therefore, e.g. low municipal spending might just 
reflect heavily restricted competences and not particularly efficient governance. Hence, there is 
a substitution effect among municipal and cantonal spending and taxation (see Eichenberger 
1994, Schaltegger 2001). This makes it necessary to analyze data including both government 
levels simultaneously. 
 
Since not all desirable information is available at the municipal level, we analyze two different 
datasets each including cantonal and local level data, but one aggregated at the municipal, and 
one aggregated at the cantonal level. Focusing on the municipal dataset we can test Hypothesis 
1 by estimating the influence of local auditors on income tax rates. We also disaggregate the 
auditor index and analyze the impact of the various sub-indices. Furthermore, we evaluate 
whether auditors with an extended mandate have a greater impact in larger municipalities in 
which the collective action problem should be more pronounced (Hypothesis 2). The dataset 
containing information aggregated at the cantonal level enables us to analyze the impact of 
auditors on additional dependent variables such as taxes, expenditures, revenues, and deficits 
(Hypothesis 1). 
 
4.1. Municipal data 
 
Our empirical analysis at the local level focuses on data for the aggregated cantonal and local 
income tax rate of a natural person, for which there is a dataset from the Swiss Federal Tax 
11
Administration. This dataset provides information on tax rates for the 730 largest Swiss 
municipalities. Since the dataset is only available for a few years and we do not observe any 
significant variation in the design of the audit institution in this period, we conduct a cross-
section analysis for the year 1999. 
 
Dependent variable: Tax rates 
 
The tax rate includes taxes of the canton, the municipality, and the local official church 
communities (which have the power to tax) on a natural person’s annual income. The dataset 
contains 16 income brackets between CHF 20’000 and 1’000’000 and 3 household types: 
“single, employed wage earner”, “married, sole wage earner”, and “married, sole wage earner 
with 2 children”. We calculate the average tax rates across all income brackets between CHF 
40’000 and 200’000 annual income and across the three household types. Estimations with the 
complete dataset controlling for the different income and household classes produce largely the 
same results. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
The finance commission index capturing important aspects of the institutional design of local 
audit institutions varies considerably across cantons, but the intra-cantonal design is fairly 
homogenous. The variable enters the dataset as the auditor variable and varies between 0 and 4. 
 
Other institutional features such as the extent of local and cantonal direct democratic rights or 
the degree of decentralization are important for studies on Switzerland. Therefore, we include 
different indicators for direct democratic instruments and fiscal decentralization in our empirical 
models. Direct democracy at the local level is captured by a dummy variable for town meeting 
(1) or parliamentary democracy (0). To specify the magnitude of direct democracy at the 
cantonal level we use the standard indicator proposed by Stutzer (1999), and Frey and Stutzer 
(2000, 2001), which includes all relevant aspects of the extent of direct democratic instruments 
available to the citizens.7 As a robustness test we also use a sub-index focusing only on the 
availability of a financial referendum, and we use another indicator proposed by Pommerehne 
and Weck-Hannemann (1996) measuring whether the population can decide on the tax rate and 
the budget. 
                                                 
7 Christoph Schaltegger, University of St. Gallen, provided the index for various other years not included 
in Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2001). 
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To map the degree of fiscal decentralization in a specific canton we introduce an index proposed 
by Ladner (1994), which captures the extent of local autonomy for each canton as reported by 
the local chief administrators in a systematic survey. The local chief administrators of 1856 
municipalities were asked to describe the perceived extent of local autonomy on a scale between 
1 and 10. A score of 1 indicates ‘no autonomy at all’ and 10 ‘very high’ degree of local 
autonomy. This index is widely used to measure local autonomy and to proxy fiscal 
decentralization in Switzerland (e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2000, 2001, and Torgler 2004). The 
advantage of such a measure is that it captures the de facto institutional constraints of a 
municipality. It reflects the federal structure of a canton, i.e. the division of competences 
between the canton and its municipalities (Frey and Stutzer 2000). Other measures such as the 
ratio of municipal expenditures to total cantonal and local expenditures tend to be endogenous 
to the institutional framework and many other factors. However, as this ratio is one of the 
standard approaches for cross-country research and is also used in Switzerland (e.g. Schaltegger 
2001 and Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger 2003), we include it as an alternative measure. 
 
To control for community specific characteristics, which impact on public expenditures and 
taxes, we include a broad set of standard control variables such as the average municipal 
income, the population size, its demographic structure, the unemployment rate, the fraction of 
foreign population. Furthermore, we also include topographic factors such as the surface of the 
municipality, its edificial, industrial, agricultural, and mountainous fraction, level of education, 
political preferences as measured by party support in federal elections, and a dummy for 
language affiliation (German 1, else 0). The cultural background reflected by the language 
affiliation serves as a proxy measure for fiscal preferences. Pujol and Weber (2001) and Funk 
and Gathmann (2005) show that there is a systematic relationship between cultural affiliation 
and fiscal preferences. 
 
To control for effects due to some specific income distribution (e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981) 
it would be useful to have data on the mean and median income or gini-coefficients (pre- and 
after-tax). This data is, however, only available for the fiscal year 1995/1996 (Ecoplan 2004). 
Even though the time periods do not perfectly match, we will use the data as a further 
robustness check. 
 
Of course, it would also be interesting to control for other political variables, such as the 
composition of the government and government fractionalization, which have been found to be 
relevant in explaining fiscal policy in cross-country as well as in US cross-state regressions. 
However, for the Swiss local level, data on the composition of the governments is neither 
available nor would it be very informative. Since most members of Swiss local governments are 
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elected on a personal basis in majority votes they are often not members of an established 
political party. Moreover, it is difficult to compare political parties across cantons as even the 
cantonal sections of parties with nationwide activities largely differ between cantons, as is, e.g., 
evidenced in the fact that they often advance opposing recommendations for nationwide 
referenda. Therefore, we do not include measures for the political position as well as the 
composition of the government to our estimates. However, we include average party support in 
national elections per municipality for the main national parties. Furthermore, we also try to 
control for local public goods provision. However, there is only sufficiently good data on the 
availability of public transportation.8 
 
4.2. Cantonal data 
 
At the cantonal level we assemble a dataset for the period between 1990 and 2000. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain reliable information about the de facto design of local 
audit institutions further back in time.  
 
Dependent variable: Tax burden and government expenditures 
 
Reliable data exists for the aggregate of the local and cantonal tax burden as well as public 
expenditures, revenues, and deficits for each canton. The aggregated tax burden on natural 
persons is an index constructed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and includes the taxes 
levied by the canton, the municipality, and the local official church communities on a natural 
person’s annual income. The data on aggregated local and cantonal per capita public 
expenditures and revenues include the cantonal government expenditures (revenues) and the 
aggregated government expenditures (revenues) from all municipalities in the same canton over 
a budgetary period and are provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Administration. Unfortunately, 
these data also include federal grants, which are used to finance federal and trans-regional 
infrastructure projects. These vertical transfers appear in cantonal expenditures even though 
they are heavily co-financed by the federal government. In this respect the Canton of Uri is an 
outlier because a large share of its budget consists of such infrastructure projects. Thus, in our 
expenditure regressions we eliminate the observations from the Canton of Uri. The data on 
public deficits is simply the yearly difference between revenues and expenditures. 
 
                                                 
8 In order to evaluate the effect of institutions on fiscal variables, controlling for public goods provision is 
important. It is obviously a very challenging task to find good proxies for public goods provision and 
hence, most empirical studies do not even attempt to deal with this problem. We are aware that the 
proxies we use in the entire study are not perfect. However, we consider testing the robustness of our 
results with these imperfect measures to be an improvement. 
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Explanatory variables 
 
We already discussed the institutional variables we use to analyze municipal data. Most of these 
variables can directly be used for our analysis at the cantonal level. However, the dummy 
variable for local direct democracy must be refined. In this dataset at the cantonal level we use 
the fraction of the cantonal population living in municipalities with town meetings. 
Furthermore, our auditor measure must also be adapted. Because powerful independent auditors 
only exist in municipalities with town meetings, we weight the finance commission index with 
the prevalence of town meetings in each canton. 
 
We include a standard set of control variables mostly identical to the covariates discussed for 
the municipal dataset. However, we have some additional variables reflecting various aspects of 
public goods provision. The dataset contains data about primary and secondary school 
enrollment, class size, traffic infrastructure, medical doctors per capita, pharmacies per capita, 
rental prices, conviction rate, prison sentences per capita, and fines per capita etc. 
Unfortunately, we could not identify better proxies because e.g. school performance measures 
etc. are not systematically available in Switzerland. 
 
As a further step to reduce omitted variable bias, we include direct measures of fiscal 
preferences. Fiscal preferences might be important when analyzing fiscal institutions. They 
could be the driving force in establishing institutions and simultaneously also directly shaping 
the policy outcome. Not including such a measure could result in serious endogeneity problems, 
where the effect of institutions cannot be separated from fiscal preferences. It is only recently 
that Funk and Gathmann (2005) calculated measures of fiscal preferences by analyzing 
initiatives and referenda at the national level. Using factor analysis and a broad set of direct 
democratic policy decisions, they identify three factors that reflect different fiscal preference 
dimensions. They show that the influence of direct democracy is substantially reduced if fiscal 
preferences are taken into account. 
 
For more information on the most important variables see the details and descriptive statistics in 
Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix. 
 
4.3. Empirical strategy 
 
The municipal cross-section data provide information to test whether auditors with an extended 
audit mandate have an influence on tax rates (Hypothesis 1) and if this impact varies conditional 
on the size of a community (Hypothesis 2). We estimate the effects using ordinary least squares 
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(OLS) and weighted least squares (WLS) estimators and adjust standard errors for clustering. 
Within the cantons municipalities face similar constraints and the standard errors may be 
correlated within cantons. Therefore, we correct the standard errors by clustering according to 
the 26 cantons (Moulton 1986). Without clustering we may encounter downward bias of the 
standard errors. To account for the possibility of non-random sampling, we estimate WLS 
models. To obtain approximately unbiased estimates we include sampling weights equal to the 
inverse of the probability of a municipality being included in the sample.9 
 
The cantonal dataset assembles data between 1990 and 2000. Since we do not observe any 
significant variation of our institutional variables over time, we cannot control for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity in a fixed effects (FE) framework. Thus, we estimate random effects 
(RE) models, which assume cross-section error components to be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables. We also estimate our data panel with a pooled OLS model, which is the 
standard method applied by most studies facing time invariant institutions. We consider the RE 
estimator to be our first reference and report langrangian multiplier tests.10 We further check the 
robustness of our results by estimating every year in a single cross-section and we present 
results for the first and last year of our panel.11 
 
Obviously, there are serious concerns about the causal impact of auditors on fiscal variables. 
Our estimates could suffer from reverse causality, simultaneity, and omitted variable bias. 
Effective institutions are not necessarily exogenously given. Given the time persistence of our 
institutional variables, reverse causation seems not to be a great concern. However, simultaneity 
and omitted variable bias need to be addressed more carefully and we follow several strategies. 
First, as already mentioned we introduce a measure of fiscal preferences proposed by Funk and 
Gathmann (2005). If the audit institution is only the result of specific fiscal preferences, which 
at the same time also shapes political outcomes, then we could not make inference about the 
influence of local auditors. The inclusion of a fiscal preference measure in our empirical model 
should clarify this point. Secondly, we test a differential hypothesis (Hypotheses 2) which 
makes it less plausible that an unobserved factor drives the results so subtly. Thirdly, we present 
                                                 
9 It might be possible that the probability of a municipality being included in the sample depends as well 
on its population size. Therefore, we also calculated population size adjusted sampling weights. Our 
results are widely unaffected. In the following discussion we will use the more common and also more 
conservative sampling weights. 
 
10 Besley and Case (2003) also discuss this problem and they present their results for the impact of voter 
initiatives (that do not vary significantly over time) on taxes and expenditures. They use OLS, RE, and 
regressions on state means. They report fairly large differences of the estimated coefficients when 
applying these methods, especially when analyzing government expenditures. 
 
11 Cross-section results for the entire period can be found in Schelker (2007). 
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an instrumental variable (IV) approach and run two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions (e.g. 
Wooldridge 2002) in a separate paragraph. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1. Hypothesis 1 – Municipal data 
 
Hypothesis 1 suggests a negative impact of stronger audit mandates including ex ante audits on 
tax rates. Column 1 of Table 1 contains a simple OLS regression with standard errors adjusted 
for clustering. In this basic regression model we include the auditor variable, other institutional 
variables, local income, and the population measure. Column 2 presents the same basic 
regression estimated using a WLS model in which we control for potential selection bias by 
introducing sampling weights. Columns 3 to 7 add groups of control variables to the basic 
regression model in column 2. We first add the language variable as a proxy for fiscal 
preferences, and then include socio-demographic, topographic and economic variables, public 
goods and political proxies, and finally we estimate all covariates simultaneously. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The econometric results in Table 1 confirm the expected theoretical effects of Hypothesis 1. The 
auditor variable exercises a highly significant negative impact on the aggregated cantonal and 
municipal tax rates. A one point increase of the auditor variable implies an average reduction of 
the income tax rate of roughly 0.45 percentage points. The results from the basic regressions are 
not sensitive to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. The estimated coefficient 
remains stable and highly statistically significant. Since the auditor variable ranges from 0 to 4 a 
maximum potential reduction of roughly 1.8 percentage points is possible. Taking into account 
that the average tax rate amounts to roughly 11 percent, the potential effect of the auditor design 
on the individual tax rate is about 16-17 percent lower taxes if auditors are fully integrated 
during the policy process. Consequently, the effect of audit institutions is not only statistically 
significant, but also economically highly relevant. 
 
Local direct democracy in the form of town meetings exhibits a positive impact on tax rates. 
The coefficient is statistically significant, and its influence is with 1.1 fairly high. Ranging from 
0 to 1 the potential effect is roughly 10 percent higher taxes. However, the potential effect of 
local direct democracy is still much smaller than the potential effect of the auditor variable. 
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Cantonal direct democratic instruments do not significantly affect tax rates. The results also 
hold for alternative measures of direct democracy such as the sub-index reflecting the right to a 
financial referendum by Frey and Stutzer (2000) or the measure proposed by Pommerehne and 
Weck-Hannemann (1996). In line with the standard literature, fiscal decentralization exhibits a 
large negative and significant influence on tax rates. For every unit of increasing local 
autonomy, we estimate an average tax rate reduction of roughly 1.2 percentage points. 
Considering that the variable ranges from 3.2 to 6.1 we observe a potential effect of 3.5 
percentage points, or up to 30 percent lower tax rates, which makes fiscal decentralization 
highly relevant. We provide a brief discussion and some interpretation of the overall effects of 
institutional variables at the end of the empirical section. 
 
Local income has a strong negative impact on the tax rate, while the population measure does 
not reach statistical significance. Furthermore, our results are robust to the inclusion of a fiscal 
preferences proxy measure (language), which indicates that the influence of auditors is not 
endogenous to fiscal preferences (column 3). The additional socio-demographic variables 
basically confirm the expected results; however, their impact is frequently not statistically 
different from zero. The fraction of the population not included in the production process (old 
and young) both exhibit a tax increasing effect. Including further control variables such as the 
population density, the mountainous, agricultural and industrial area, or the fraction of votes 
for the social democrats (which could also be interpreted as a proxy measure for fiscal 
preferences), or the fraction of the population using public transportation to commute to work 
(public goods proxy) do not affect our results of the influence of local auditors on taxes. We 
also tested whether some specific income distribution affects our results and included the mean 
to median income ratio, even though the data is only available for the fiscal year 1995/1996. 
Our results are robust to the inclusion of all these measures. 
 
Subsequently we only present the results of our main variables of interest and do not discuss the 
effect of control variables as long as the effects are similar to previous results. We restrict our 
discussion to additional or ‘surprising’ results. 
 
Disaggregating the auditor variable 
 
In order to better understand the influence of the different parts of the auditor variable we 
disaggregate the auditor index into its main elements. Following our theoretical discussion the 
difference between ex post and ex ante auditing mandates seems most important. Totally 
disaggregating the index is not suitable because the sub-indices are not entirely independent 
from each other. For example it would not make sense to endow the auditor with proposal rights 
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during the policy process without endowing it with at least some audit rights ex ante to policy 
decisions. Furthermore, it is also true that if an auditor can evaluate individual policy projects, it 
is also endowed with the right to analyze the budget proposal. Thus, the ex ante measures of our 
index are not entirely independent from each other. Therefore, we will mainly disaggregate the 
index into an ex post (dummy) and an ex ante (scale 0-2) variable. 
 
In Table 2 we present the results when disaggregating the auditor index and estimate the 
different components separately.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
We find a significantly negative influence of ex post audits in all estimated specifications. This 
indicates that analyzing individual projects after implementation has beneficial effects. The 
result is also consistent with general findings evaluating US auditing institutions (Schelker 
2007). The influence is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. The 
estimated coefficient decreases when including the ex ante audit variable. Otherwise, the 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables and changes in the 
specification, such as simple OLS estimation or the inclusion of different sampling weights. 
 
The influence of ex ante audits also exhibits a statistically significant and robust negative 
influence. The coefficient of the ex ante variable also decreases in size when including the ex 
post audit variable. Since the measure adds two dummy variables (budget proposals and 
individual project audits) and hence ranges from 0 to 2, the potential effect results in around 9 
percent lower tax rates (columns 5 and 6), which is similar in magnitude to the potential impact 
of ex post audits (varying between 0 and 1). 
 
Our estimates of the ex ante indicator including the proposal rights variable yield significant 
negative coefficients (columns 7 and 8). The measure ranges from 0 to 3 and exhibits a potential 
impact of a roughly 9 percent tax reduction. We find that the influence of proposal rights is 
weakest and does not have a significant effect on its own (estimates not reported). This is not 
entirely surprising because all finance commissions have to submit a report to the citizens. We 
observed that if auditors do not have a formal right to advance counterproposals, often a citizen 
close to a member of the finance commission proposes amendments. Furthermore, if the reports 
contain all relevant information and are easy accessible, the transaction costs for individual 
citizens to make proposals and amendments based on the audit report should be relatively low. 
The magnitude of the combined effect of the ex post and the ex ante measures is, with roughly 
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1.8 percentage points (16 percent) lower tax rates, similar to the estimates including the auditor 
index entirely. 
 
If we include all four measures (individual projects ex post, budget proposals ex ante, individual 
projects ex ante, and proposal rights) separately we only find significant effects for the ex post 
measure (not reported). All other measures do not reach statistical significance, but the 
coefficients are very close to the ones presented in Table 2. This finding is not at all surprising 
because there is only one ex post variable, whereas there are three ex ante variables 
characterizing the activity during the policy process, which are correlated. An F-test of joint 
significance of all auditor sub-indices indicates a significant influence of this set of variables. 
 
Unfortunately, when using the dataset at the cantonal level, some of the sub-indices do not 
feature sufficient variation to estimate reasonable effects. Furthermore, the cantonal data would 
also require the indices to be weighted with the prevalence of town meetings (see previous 
discussion). 
 
5.2. Hypothesis 1 – Cantonal data 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 present the estimates on taxes and expenditures for the dataset at the 
cantonal level. Since the data are aggregated at the cantonal level and we face a much smaller 
data sample that contains only the 26 cantons over several years, we cannot expect to find 
results that are as clear as at the local level. Our tables present simple cross-section estimates for 
the first and last year of the sample period, report the pooled OLS results for our basic variables, 
and then present the estimated coefficients using random effects (RE) models with and without 
time effects. 
 
a) Taxes 
 
Focusing on the tax data we see from Table 3 that the estimated auditor coefficient is 
significant in all different regression models. The coefficient is fairly stable around a value of 
about -9 and remains statistically significant even for the cross-section estimates with only 26 
observations (columns 1 and 2). When comparing a canton with municipalities featuring the 
weakest form of auditors with one featuring the most powerful audit institution, the potential 
effect on taxes is roughly 25 percent tax relief (16-17 percent in local dataset). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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These results hold also for the other yearly cross-section estimates, for which only the years 
1995 and 1996 do not reach statistical significance. The pooled OLS estimates (columns 3 and 
4) yield significant effects even with standard errors adjusted for clustering. Estimates without 
clustered standard errors produce much smaller standard errors. The coefficients reported in 
columns 5 to 7 estimating RE models produce largely the same results. In column 6 we report 
the results for one of the three fiscal preference measures (factor 1). This measure reflects 
conservative-liberal dimensions (Funk and Gathmann 2005: 20) and is the only measure having 
a significant influence in at least some regressions.12 Including the other measures does not 
impact on our main findings either. The additional variables – which we also included 
separately (not reported) – are socio-demographic variables (unemployment, share of young and 
elderly population, share of foreigners), structural variables (population density, topographic 
conditions, fraction of industrial area), and variables reflecting public goods provision (class 
size in primary school, rental prices, convictions per capita, and total road length). When 
including these measures (column 7), the estimated auditor coefficient remains statistically 
significant, and the effect remains large if all variables are included simultaneously. Note that 
the estimates remain largely robust to the inclusion of proxy variables for public goods 
provision. Furthermore, year fixed effects do not alter our results. 
 
b) Expenditures 
 
When analyzing expenditure data (Table 4) we find additional evidence for our theoretical 
predictions that powerful auditors significantly reduce total public expenditures. We find 
statistically significant estimates for almost all different estimation procedures and 
specifications. However, compared to our previous estimates on taxation, the estimated 
coefficients are more affected by variations in model specifications. Even though the effects 
mostly reach statistical significance, the coefficients vary in size. As can be seen from Table 4, 
the estimated auditor coefficient varies between -511 and -1086. The interpretation of the 
coefficient is straightforward: A one point increase in the auditor variable reduces expenditures 
between 500 to 1000 CHF per capita, which results in a potential effect of around 13 to 26 
percent lower expenditures.13 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
                                                 
12 Factor 1: conservative-liberal attitudes, Factor 2: attitudes favorable to redistribution, Factor 3: attitudes 
favorable to regulation. For details see Funk and Gathmann (2005). 
 
13 We also estimated the effects using log specifications. The estimates are very similar and available 
upon request. 
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Column 6 shows the results including a measure for fiscal preferences (Factor 3). We use the 
third factor (preference for state regulation) because it is the only factor that is statistically 
significant in at least some specifications. The other factors do not exhibit a significant 
influence and do not change the results. In some RE specifications including larger subgroups of 
additional control variables, the estimated auditor coefficient does not reach conventional levels 
of statistical significance, but it reaches again values between -500 and -900. It is not surprising 
that the data aggregated at the cantonal level are more sensitive to the inclusion of many 
different variables at the same time. The number of cantons is constraining and the yearly 
observations cannot be considered completely independent. In this light the results are even 
more striking that we always find a large negative, and in nearly all cases statistically 
significant, impact of auditors on government expenditures. 
 
Summing up, as suggested by Hypothesis 1, more powerful auditors significantly reduce taxes 
and expenditures. The effects are not only statistically significant, but they are also large and 
economically highly relevant. The effect of direct democracy does not seem to be robust and 
remains inconclusive. The estimates concerning decentralization are negative and largely in line 
with the literature and other studies for Switzerland. According to our expectations income 
affects expenditures and taxes, whereas the population measure does not impact on our data.14 
 
5.3. Hypothesis 2 – Municipal data 
 
According to hypothesis 2 larger municipalities face a more pronounced control and collective 
action problem than smaller municipalities. In smaller towns citizens might be better able to 
overcome the free-rider problem. Thus, the broader interests are better ‘organized’ and the 
asymmetry between general and special interests is smaller. Furthermore, in smaller towns it 
should be easier to monitor the government, because their problems and policies are less 
complex, and social ties might induce public officials not to deviate too much since they could 
suffer social punishment. Therefore, the control and the collective action problem should be 
more pronounced in larger municipalities. Hence, the impact of auditors with an extended 
mandate should be higher in such municipalities. We test this hypothesis by estimating an 
interaction term of our auditor variable with the population size. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
                                                 
14 We also estimated log specifications, which did not change our findings. However, the squared term of 
our population measure sometimes had a small positive significant impact. 
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The results in Table 5 report empirical support for this hypothesis. In most specifications the 
interaction term of the auditor with the population variable has a statistically significant 
negative influence on tax rates. The estimates are robust to variations in model specifications 
and to the inclusion of additional controls. The estimated effect of the auditor variable by itself 
remains almost unaffected. Also the estimates of the other variables are robust to the inclusion 
of the interaction term. The result suggests that auditors with an extensive audit mandate are 
especially beneficial in large municipalities with a more pronounced control and collective 
action problem. 
 
5.4. Causality issues 
 
Causality is obviously a crucial issue. Our theoretical considerations suggest a causal 
relationship going from auditors to policy outcomes. However, one might come up with 
arguments suggesting reverse causation or that a third unobserved factor determines both 
aspects simultaneously. Certainly, institutions do evolve over time and insofar, they are partly 
endogenous. 
 
In our case, it is difficult to argue for reverse causality, because the institutional design of audit 
institutions was fairly stable over time. The second argument of simultaneity is more important 
for fiscal institutions. It is often argued that fiscal institutions are shaped by certain fiscal 
preferences that simultaneously determine policy outcome and institutional design. As already 
mentioned we address this issue by including a measure for fiscal preferences and we did not 
find evidence challenging our results. Furthermore, we discussed a differential hypothesis 
derived from our theory. This makes it less plausible that an unobserved factor is driving both 
institutions and outcomes simultaneously in such a subtle way. Even less convincing is the 
argument of reverse causality. However, we also try to address the problem of causality 
econometrically by estimating instrumental variables. 
 
Typically, it is very difficult to find valid instruments for institutions. Cross-country research 
has established various cultural, geographic, and historical variables such as language, colonial 
origin, legal origins, distance from the equator, or settler mortality as instruments (see e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini 2004, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2003, Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2001, Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). In US cross-state research 
topographical features such as natural boundaries (e.g. streams) have been used to estimate the 
influence of school competition on public school productivity and student achievements (Hoxby 
2000). Following these approaches we consider measures reflecting culture (language) and 
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topographic circumstances and briefly discuss how these characteristics might shape the 
evolution of institutions. 
 
Drawing on these studies we test geographical and topographical instrumental variables. We use 
cantonal size, topographic conditions, and the number of neighboring cantons as instrumental 
variables. We suggest that institutions are correlated with features such as cantonal size and 
topography. One mechanism is that effective institutions are more difficult to establish in large 
jurisdictions. This could be due to a high dispersion of citizens, which makes communication 
and coordination difficult, or alternatively due to a large number of citizens also making it 
difficult to become organized. A similar argument can be made for cantonal topographical 
characteristics. Difficult topographic circumstances may influence the evolution of institutions 
at the cantonal level. To proxy topographic characteristics in the municipal dataset we use the 
mountainous fraction of a municipality and in the cantonal dataset we use the topography 
indicator. Furthermore, having more neighboring jurisdictions might imply that citizens have 
more opportunities to learn and, therefore, effective institutions might spread more rapidly. For 
most specifications the instrumental variables seem to be strong and the value of an F-test of 
joint-significance mostly lies above the critical value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
 
Of course, we test the exclusion restriction of our instruments conducting J-tests of over-
identifying restrictions. Topography can only be included in the tax regressions, since with 
expenditures it is an important regressor in the second stage itself. We use the cantonal size, and 
the number of neighboring cantons, and where possible topography as instrumental variables. 
However, even for the two first instruments the exclusion restriction is not satisfied in all 
specifications (Table 6, columns 4 and 5). Table 6 presents the results for our 2SLS estimates. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
We again find significant effects for our instrumented auditor variable on both tax variables at 
the local and cantonal level. The estimated coefficients tend to be higher compared to the 
previous estimates. While the model including the full set of controls exhibits significant 
estimates, the basic regression on taxes aggregated at the cantonal level does not quite reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance. The variation of our results for government 
expenditures is again higher. When including additional control variables we mostly find 
significant effects, but our results are in some specification sensitive to the inclusion of time-
invariant controls. Note that our instrumental variables do not perform extremely well. In the 
reported J-test of over-identifying restrictions, the exclusion restriction is not always met. In 
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two reported specifications (columns 4 and 5) we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. 
 
Summing up, the identification problem has been discussed from various perspectives. First, in 
light of the long persistence of these institutions reverse causality is very unlikely. Secondly, 
including fiscal preferences – one of the main sources of potential simultaneity – did not affect 
our results. Thirdly, our differential hypothesis (Hypotheses 2) derived from our theoretical 
arguments and tested empirically make it hard to argue in favor of endogeneity. Fourthly, our 
IV regressions also suggest a negative impact of auditors on taxes and expenditures. However, 
note that our instrumental variables do not always meet statistical requirements. 
 
5.5. Further evidence and discussion 
 
In this subsection we discuss further evidence on the influence of auditors on additional 
dependent variables such as total government revenues and deficits. We also take a look at 
migration. If good institutions are perceived as such, one might expect to find migration into 
these jurisdictions. We also address a critical issue that has been brought up in discussions. A 
major concern is that auditors just cater to the rich, who have a preference for low taxes. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Government revenues 
 
We first present the estimation results on some additional public finance variables. Government 
revenues are available as aggregated data at the cantonal level. We use this data to further 
evaluate the robustness of our results. We have found ample evidence that auditors with an 
extended audit mandate have a negative impact on tax rates and we should expect the same 
pattern to be true in the case of general government revenues. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 provide further evidence for the robustness of these results. 
Government revenues are negatively and significantly affected by increasing auditor 
involvement. We use the same model specifications as for the expenditure regressions, because 
the revenue data again include federal grants, which lead us to eliminate the outlier Canton of 
Uri. Including the same set of additional controls does not alter the results. An increase of the 
auditor variable by 1 point implies a reduction of around 900 CHF per capita in government 
revenues. When moving from the weakest to the strongest form of auditor, the potential effect 
corresponds to a roughly 23 percent reduction of revenues. 
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It is not surprising that the influence of the other institutional variables is similar to the estimates 
on taxation. Both direct democracy measures do not have a statistically significant influence on 
revenues, whereas the degree of decentralization in the form of local autonomy features a strong 
significant impact in some model specifications. From the standard control variables the income 
variable and the topography variable have a positive and significant impact on revenues. These 
results are in line with our earlier findings and existing empirical literature for Switzerland. 
 
Deficits 
 
In the empirical public finance literature it is often assumed that effective institutions reduce 
deficits. With respect to auditors we do not have a clear theoretical prediction, since auditors 
should primarily affect the size of government. To complement the picture we nevertheless 
report some results. Consistently, Table 7, columns 3 and 4 do not show a clear picture and do 
not enable us to draw final conclusions. The effect is sometimes statistically significant, 
however, the results are not particularly robust to changes in model specifications. 
 
Migration 
 
If ‘good’ institutions, in the sense that they empower citizens, are attractive, we would expect 
other citizens to migrate to jurisdictions featuring such institutions. This argument draws on 
Tiebout’s ‘voting by feet’ hypothesis, which suggests that citizens migrate to jurisdictions with 
the best cost-benefit ratio. A first glance at the empirical results (Table 7, columns 5 and 6) 
suggests that an institutional arrangement with powerful auditors has attracted citizens during 
the 1990’s. The dependent variable is the change in the population due to migration (not birth or 
death) between 1990 and 2000. An increase of one point of the auditor variable implies an 
increase of 1.5 percent of the local population due to immigration. Cantonal direct democracy 
and income also seem to have an influence. Note that such an argument does not necessarily 
require some form of disequilibrium or reduced mobility of the citizens. As Switzerland had a 
high population growth and the impact of auditors is more pronounced in municipalities with a 
larger population, the relative advantages of municipalities with strong auditors have increased. 
Thus, strong auditors might induce migration even in equilibrium. 
 
Are auditors just an instrument of the rich to keep taxes low? 
 
One concern could be that auditors just cater to the rich who prefer lower taxes. From the 
limited data we have, we do not find indications that this is actually the case. Keeping in mind 
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that auditors can only consult citizens about the potential impact of policy proposals, they 
cannot decide themselves on public policy. 
 
If we first focus on the selection of the members in the local audit office in the Canton of Zurich 
(for which we conducted a systematic survey) it does not seem that the rich are over-
proportionally elected to the audit office. It seems that often personal qualifications are the 
driving factor. If secondly, our estimates controlling for the provision of at least some public 
goods are valid, we find no indication that public goods provision is worse in jurisdictions with 
a stronger form of auditor. If auditors nevertheless cater specifically to the rich, we might expect 
a more unequal income distribution. More specifically, we should expect to find indications that 
jurisdictions with strong auditors favoring the rich should (ceteris paribus) redistribute less from 
rich to poor. Hence, we should find a systematic difference in the income distributions between 
jurisdictions with weak and strong auditors. The available data contains information about the 
after-tax gini-coefficients calculated for the fiscal year 1995/1996. We find a statistically 
significant negative effect of increasing values of the auditor variable on the after-tax gini-
coefficient (Table 7, columns 7 and 8). This result implies that auditors are unlikely to 
particularly represent the interests of the rich. However, note that a strict test would require 
comparing pre- and after-tax gini-coefficients. Unfortunately, we do not have such detailed data. 
 
5.6. Empirical evidence: The big picture 
 
When looking at the big picture the basic effects of extending the audit mandate seems to be 
well established. Table 8 summarizes the results including other institutional variables. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
We generally find that auditors with an extended mandate significantly reduce taxes, 
expenditures, and revenues. The effect on deficits seems to be weakly negative. Our estimates 
analyzing migration patterns also indicate that auditors with a stronger mandate tend to attract 
more people. The results on income distribution point toward some beneficial effects, but we 
abstain from a strong interpretation of these results due to some data limitations. 
 
At first glance the evidence on local and cantonal direct democracy seems to be inconsistent 
with the emerging literature on direct democracy, which tends to find negative effects of direct 
democracy on public finance variables. However, most of the earlier studies did not focus on the 
influence of direct democracy on the tax burden but rather on expenditures, deficits, and debt, 
and did not estimate the cantonal and local level simultaneously. However, when taking a closer 
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look at the broad picture, we find some interesting patterns that nicely fits the available 
evidence. Focusing on the extent of local direct democracy fiscal balance seems to be of major 
importance. We find that town meeting democracies have a negative effect on public 
expenditures and revenues, but a positive effect on taxes and a weak negative effect on deficits. 
It indicates that if citizens directly choose among policy alternatives they tend to spend less 
money, which is consistent with Public Choice theories suggesting a leviathan government (e.g. 
Brennan and Buchanan 1977) and with available empirical evidence for Switzerland. However, 
even though expenditures and revenues are lower in municipalities with town meetings, taxes 
tend to be significantly higher than in municipalities featuring a parliament. This could indicate 
that citizens in town meeting democracies are more willing to pay taxes in the present rather 
than to either shift the burden to future periods or via capitalization to property owners 
(Stadelmann and Eichenberger 2008). This is consistent with the relatively lower fiscal deficits, 
but the estimates are mostly only marginally significant. Migration and income distribution do 
not seem to be affected. The empirical evidence on the influence of cantonal direct democracy 
is weaker and not entirely conclusive. We cannot find a direct effect of cantonal direct 
democracy on the tax burden. However, it seems that revenues and expenditures are decreasing 
with more available direct democratic rights, which would be in line with most empirical 
evidence (e.g. Feld and Kirchgässner 2001, Feld and Matsusaka 2003). The estimates on the 
influence of direct democracy on public deficits tend to be positive, which is also in line with 
the empirical evidence for Switzerland (Feld and Kirchgässner 2001). Funk and Gathmann 
(2005) use cantonal expenditures and revenues as well as aggregated cantonal and local level 
expenditures and revenues. When only focusing on the cantonal data, they can replicate earlier 
findings (e.g. Feld and Matsusaka 2003). But as soon as they focus on expenditure data at the 
local level only, they find positive effects, and they cannot find any effect if using (similar to 
our analysis) aggregated data from the local and cantonal level. Our estimates on income 
distribution do not provide clear results, whereas the migration estimates indicate a negative 
effect. 
 
The estimates for the influence of fiscal decentralization point towards lower government 
expenditures, revenues, and taxes, which is consistent with the available empirical evidence for 
Switzerland (e.g. Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger 2003). The estimates indicate that fiscal 
decentralization mainly affects government size but less deficits, income distribution, or 
migration. 
 
Furthermore, Torgler (2004) drawing on our early work on auditors empirically analyzes their 
impact on tax moral. The basic argument is that citizens are more willing to contribute to the 
local public good if they can better control the agent and if public goods provision is more 
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effectively tailored to the preferences of the citizens. Using our auditor index he finds that more 
powerful auditors enhance tax moral. However, in contrast to the estimates on expenditures and 
taxes the effect is not robust to the inclusion of the extent of direct democratic instruments 
available to the citizens. 
 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
 
Public auditing institutions are generally considered important, but so far the analysis has not 
taken into account the potential influence of auditors beyond the traditional scope of controlling 
the executive and the bureaucracy ex post to policy decisions. We argue that auditors can play a 
much more important role during the policy making process in which their ex ante evaluation of 
the budget draft and individual projects improve transparency and reduce the influence of 
special interest groups that extract rents at the expense of unorganized general interests. 
 
In the empirical section we analyze the impact of auditors on fiscal variables, such as taxes and 
expenditures as well as on several other measures. We follow our theoretical hypotheses that 
predict lower taxes and expenditures if auditors have an extended audit mandate including ex 
ante audits of the budget draft and individual policy proposals. Furthermore, we have 
established that auditors should be more effective in large municipalities in which control and 
collective action problems are more pronounced. We discover support for both theoretical 
hypotheses. We find a large negative, economically, and statistically significant influence on 
taxes and expenditures. Furthermore, auditors have a stronger impact in larger than in smaller 
municipalities and they do not seem to have an influence on the already organized business 
interests. This is exactly what we would expect from our channel through which auditors have 
an influence on policy decisions. They provide information that is not produced during the 
policymaking process due to the collective action problem of large groups such as broad-based 
common pool interests. We find robust results for different degrees of data aggregation as well 
as for changes in the empirical specifications. To establish causal relations we follow three 
different strategies. Firstly, we proxy our main source of potential endogeneity with new 
measures of fiscal preferences. Secondly, we test a differential hypothesis in which the main 
channels of endogeneity look rather implausible. Thirdly, we estimate instrumental variables 
and find similar results in most specifications. However, as in many other studies it proofs to be 
very difficult to find valid instruments. These three different approaches basically confirm our 
previous results and indicate a robust relationship in which more powerful auditors reduce taxes 
and public expenditures. We conclude that audit institutions should be evaluated from a 
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different perspective that takes into account their potential to reduce the asymmetric influence 
of special interests during the policymaking process. 
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 Appendix  
Table A1: Construction of the auditor variables (finance commission index) 
Canton Budget 
proposal ex 
ante 
Individual 
projects  
ex post 
Individual 
projects  
ex ante 
Alternative 
propositions
Auditor 
(Finance 
commission 
index) 
Prevalence 
of town 
meeting a) 
Auditor 
variable for 
cantonal 
data 
Argovia 1 1 0 1 3 0.78 2.34 
Appenzell OR 0 1 0 0 1 0.71 0.71 
Appenzell IR 0 1 0 0 1 1.00 1.00 
Basle-Country 1 1 0 1 3 0.70 2.10 
Basle-Town - - - - - 0.00 0.00 
Berne 0 0 0 0 0 0.55 0.00 
Fribourg 1 1 1 1 4 0.63 2.52 
Geneva - - - - - 0.00 0.00 
Glarus 0 1 0 0 1 1.00 1.00 
Grisons 1 1 1 0 3 0.58 1.74 
Jura 0 0 0 0 0 0.67 0.00 
Lucerne 1 1 0 0 2 0.61 1.22 
Neuchâtel - - - - - 0.00 0.00 
Nidwalden 1 1 1 0 3 1.00 3.00 
Obwalden 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 0.00 
Schaffhausen 0 1 0 0 1 0.25 0.25 
Schwyz 1 1 1 0 3 1.00 3.00 
Solothurn 0 1 0 0 1 0.93 0.93 
St. Gall 0 1 0 0 1 0.79 0.79 
Thurgovia 0 0 0 0 0 0.79 0.00 
Ticino 1 0 1 1 3 0.04 0.12 
Uri 1 1 0 0 2 1.00 2.00 
Vaud 1 0 1 1 3 0.11 0.33 
Valais 0 0 0 0 0 0.84 0.00 
Zug 1 1 0 0 2 0.77 1.54 
Zurich 1 1 1 1 4 0.51 2.04 
a) share of population living in municipalities with town meetings  
Source: Schelker and Eichenberger (2003) 
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 Table A2: Description of municipal data for the year 1999 
Variable Min. – Max. 
Sample mean 
(Standard 
deviation)  
Description Source 
Average tax rate 5.46 - 14.59 10.92 (1.73) 
Average tax rate on a natural person’s 
annual income. Income classes: CHF 40 - 
200 thousand  
Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration 
Auditor 0 - 4 1.28 (1.52) 
Index capturing institutional design of the 
local auditor (Finance Commission Index) 
Schelker/Eichenberger 
(2003) 
Local direct 
democracy 0 / 1 
0.70 
(0.46) 
Dummy for local direct democracy: town 
meeting (1); Parliament (0). Own representation  
Cantonal direct 
democracy 1.75 - 5.69 
3.95 
(1.12) 
Cantonal direct democracy: Extent of 
direct democratic instruments available to 
the citizens 
Frey/Stutzer (2000, 
2001) 
Decentralization 3.2 - 6.1 4.86 (0.61) Decentralization: Extent of local autonomy  Ladner (1994) 
Income  0.842 - 75.020 25.111 (7.346) 
Average municipal real income per capita 
in 1000 CHF (federal direct income tax 
statistics: Reineinkommen der nat. 
Person) 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Population  1138 - 336822 7635.49 (17413.60) Size of municipal population 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Population density 0.15 - 108.99 7.93 (10.24) Population density (population per km
2) Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Foreigner  0.01 - 0.56 0.18 (0.09) Fraction of foreign municipal population  
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Unemployment  0.5 - 5.1 2.55 (0.97) Cantonal unemployment rate 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Industrial area 0.00 - 0.21 0.02 (0.02) Industrial fraction of municipal surface 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Agricultural fraction 0.00 - 0.81 0.40 (0.19) Agricultural fraction of municipal surface 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Mountainous fraction 0.00 - 0.43 0.04 (0.08) Mountainous fraction of municipal surface 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Demography (young) 0.21 - 0.47 0.33 (0.04) 
Fraction of the young population (0-24) in 
a canton 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Demography (old) 0.03 - 0.27 0.13 (0.04) 
Fraction of the old population (65+) in a 
canton 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Social Democrats 0 - 93.32 21.20 (10.49) 
Share of votes for social democratic party 
in 1999 national elections 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Language  0 / 1 0.76 (0.43) Language: German (1); else (0) Own representation  
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 Table A3: Description of cantonal data for the period 1990 – 2000 
Variable Min. – Max. 
Sample mean 
(Standard 
deviation)  
Description Source 
Tax (natural 
persons) 54.8 - 155.8 
103.03 
(19.70) 
Average cantonal and municipal tax 
burden on a natural person’s annual 
income (measured by an index with 
yearly mean 100) 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Tax (legal entities) 56.3 - 148.5 103.59 (18.41) 
Average cantonal and municipal tax 
burden on legal persons’ annual revenue 
(measured by an index with yearly mean 
100) 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Expenditures 7983.1 - 19738.2 11652.60 (2535.77) 
Aggregated local and cantonal 
government expenditures per capita (in 
real terms) 
Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration  
Revenues 7621.8 - 20895.3 11276.40 (2372.69) 
Aggregated local and cantonal 
government revenues per capita (in real 
terms) 
Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration  
Deficits -2608.2 - 3046.2 375.25  (644.51) 
Aggregated local and cantonal 
government deficits per capita (in real 
terms) 
Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration  
Auditor 0 - 3 1.02 (1.01) 
Index capturing institutional design of the 
local audit office: Product of Finance 
Commission Index and prevalence of 
town meetings per canton 
Schelker (2002), 
Schelker/Eichenberger 
(2003) 
Local direct 
democracy 0 - 1 
0.63 
(0.34) 
Fraction of population per canton living 
in municipality with town meeting 
Schelker/Eichenberger 
(2003) 
Cantonal direct 
democracy 1.50 - 5.83 
4.28 
(1.20) 
Cantonal direct democracy: Extent of 
direct democratic instruments available 
to the citizens 
Frey/Stutzer (2000, 
2001), Schaltegger 
Decentralization 3.2 - 6.1 4.99 (0.77) 
Decentralization: Extent of local 
autonomy  Ladner (1994) 
Income  28959.9 - 84605 44064.20 (9996.11) Cantonal real income per capita  
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Population  13573 - 1211647 270004.2 (277656.2) Size of cantonal population 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Population density 0.24 - 53.25 4.39 (9.96) 
Cantonal population density (population 
per km2) 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Unemployment  0 - 7.8 2.29 (1.96) Cantonal unemployment rate 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Young 0.145 - 0.283 0.225 (0.025) 
Fraction of the young population (0-18) 
in a canton 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Old 0.112 - 0.215 0.151 (0.020) 
Fraction of the old population (65+) in a 
canton 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Foreigner 0.061 - 0.380 0.166 (0.65) Share of cantonal foreign population 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
Topography 0.00 - 37.57 3.85 (8.20) 
Index of topographical conditions as 
measured by the index which is used for 
the new national fiscal equalization 
scheme (the “topographischer 
Lastenausgleichsindex des NFA”); 
increasing values denote more difficult 
conditions 
Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration 
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 Table 1: Hypothesis 1 – Auditors and Taxation (municipal data) 
Hypothesis 1: Municipal dataset, OLS and WLS estimates 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 OLS Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
Auditor -0.604 (0.078)*** 
-0.483 
(0.114)*** 
-0.493 
(0.100)*** 
-0.441 
(0.091)*** 
-0.492 
(0.101)*** 
-0.461 
(0.112)*** 
-0.435 
(0.087)*** 
Local Direct 
Democracy 
1.261 
(0.248)*** 
1.349 
(0.227)*** 
1.237 
(0.251)*** 
0.954 
(0.271)*** 
1.202 
(0.198)*** 
1.360 
(0.222)*** 
0.993 
(0.271)*** 
Cantonal Direct 
Democracy 
0.058 
(0.106) 
0.016 
(0.133) 
-0.064 
(0.142) 
-0.092 
(0.132) 
0.047 
(0.121) 
-0.020 
(0.117) 
-0.073 
(0.123) 
Decentralization -1.213 (0.241)*** 
-1.150 
(0.160)*** 
-1.165 
(0.157)*** 
-1.247 
(0.190)*** 
-1.179 
(0.180)*** 
-1.156 
(0.193)*** 
-1.167 
(0.204)*** 
Income -0.080 (0.012)*** 
-0.096 
(0.015)*** 
-0.097 
(0.015)*** 
-0.066 
(0.025)** 
-0.087 
(0.014)*** 
-0.095 
(0.018)*** 
-0.065 
(0.023)*** 
Population 1.59E-6 (3.63E-6) 
4.01E-6 
(3.97E-6) 
2.97E-6 
(3.53E-6) 
5.69E-6 
(4.05E-6) 
8.11E-6 
(4.96E-6) 
2.94E-6 
(2.89E-6) 
2.92E-6 
(3.48E-6) 
Language - - 0.382 (0.274) - - - 
-0.185 
(0.284) 
Young - - - 5.523 (3.749) - - 
6.412 
(3.352)* 
Aged - - - 5.851 (1.594)*** - - 
8.254 
(1.786)*** 
Unemployment - - - -0.180 (0.165) - - 
-0.130 
(0.147) 
Higher 
education - - - 
-0.018 
(0.019) - - 
-0.028 
(0.014)* 
Foreigner  - - - -1.472 (0.629)** - - 
-1.167 
(0.715) 
Population-
density - - - - 
-0.008 
(0.006) - 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Mountain  - - - - 1.908 (1.299) - 
0.786 
(0.906) 
Agriculture - - - - 1.083 (0.648) - 
0.898 
(0.436)* 
Industry - - - - 0.904 (1.048) - 
0.725 
(1.181) 
Public transport 
usage - - - - - 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
0.026 
(0.012)** 
Social 
democrats - - - - - 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
Observations 732 732 732 724 730 722 718 
R2 0.712 0.664 0.670 0.714 0.687  0.679 0.738 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses, adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons. Dependent Variable: 
Average aggregated tax rate including cantonal, local, and church taxes on a natural person’s annual income, 
containing 9 income classes between CHF 40 and 200 thousand and 3 classes describing household 
characteristics: “single, employed wage earner”, “married, sole wage earner”, and “married, sole wage earner with 
2 children”. Constant term not reported. Weight: Inverse probability of being included in sample. Significance 
level: * 0.05<p<0.1, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Own calculations 
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 Table 2: Hypothesis 1 – Disaggregating the auditor index (municipal data) 
Hypothesis 1: Municipal dataset, WLS estimates 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 WLS Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
Ex post 
audit 
-1.548 
(0.264)*** 
-1.404 
(0.238)*** - - 
-1.003 
(0.279)*** 
-0.781 
(0.358)** 
-1.080 
(0.270)*** 
-0.940 
(0.317)*** 
Ex ante 
audits - - 
-0.807 
(0.200)*** 
-0.757 
(0.164)*** 
-0.440 
(0.216)* 
-0.479 
(0.221)** - - 
Ex ante + 
proposal - - - - - - 
-0.282 
(0.161)** 
-0.273 
(0.145)** 
Local Direct 
Democracy 
1.369 
(0.251)*** 
1.041 
(0.296)*** 
1.219 
(0.231)*** 
0.870 
(0.261)*** 
1.424 
(0.248)*** 
1.045 
(0.291)*** 
1.427 
(0.253)*** 
1.069 
(0.294)*** 
Cant. Direct 
Democracy 
0.139 
(0.142) 
0.066 
(0.137) 
-0.088 
(0.116) 
-0.203 
(0.109)* 
0.065 
(0.144) 
-0.054 
(0.128) 
0.093 
(0.138) 
0.005 
(0.118) 
Decentraliza
tion 
-1.205 
(0.172)*** 
-1.249 
(0.208)*** 
-1.010 
(0.182)*** 
-1.045 
(0.215)*** 
-1.141 
(0.160)*** 
-1.164 
(0.197)*** 
-1.194 
(0.152)*** 
-1.220 
(0.192)*** 
Income -0.110 (0.011)*** 
-0.074 
(0.022)*** 
-0.102 
(0.013)*** 
-0.069 
(0.021)*** 
-0.102 
(0.013)*** 
-0.067 
(0.021)*** 
-0.099 
(0.015)*** 
-0.066 
(0.023)*** 
Population 3.74E-6 (3.92E-6) 
3.52E-6 
(3.26E-6) 
4.39E-6 
(4.08E-6) 
3.28E-6 
(3.43E-6) 
3.84E-6 
(3.88E-6) 
3.33E-6 
(3.42E-6) 
3.77E-6 
(3.88E-6) 
3.13E-6 
(3.47E-6) 
Add. 
controls - included - included - included - included 
Obs. 732 718 732 718 732 718 732 718 
R2 0.660 0.733 0.652 0.738 0.677  0.751 0.674 0.744 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses, adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons.  Dependent Variable: 
Average aggregated tax rate including cantonal, local, and church taxes on a natural person’s annual income, 
containing 9 income classes between CHF 40 and 200 thousand and 3 classes describing household 
characteristics: “single, employed wage earner”, “married, sole wage earner”, and “married, sole wage earner with 
2 children”. Additional controls: population density, demography (aged, young), language, unemployment, tertiary 
education, share of foreigners, mountainous area, agricultural area, industrial area, public transportation, party 
support for social democrats. Constant term not reported. Weight: Inverse probability of being sampled. 
Significance level: * 0.05<p<0.1, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Own calculations 
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 Table 3: Hypothesis 1 – Auditors and Taxation (cantonal dataset) 
Cantonal Data: Tax regressions 1990 – 2000 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Period 1990 2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 
Estimation 
Method OLS OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS RE RE RE 
Auditor -9.074 (4.407)** 
-10.475 
(4.051)** 
-9.241 
(3.667)** 
-9.229 
(3.749)** 
-11.358 
(3.693)*** 
-10.359 
(3.216)*** 
-7.003 
(3.463)** 
Local Direct 
Democracy 
12.445 
(17.469) 
-2.524 
(12.865) 
3.547 
(10.939) 
3.620 
(11.460) 
8.191 
(9.229) 
11.544 
(8.598) 
-2.258 
(13.972) 
Cantonal Direct 
Democracy 
0.924 
(5.203) 
1.983 
(4.176) 
0.399 
(4.121) 
0.351 
(4.217) 
1.666 
(3.625) 
3.751 
(4.254) 
-0.247 
(3.344) 
Decentralization -9.457 (4.761)* 
-6.089 
(3.705) 
-7.165 
(2.918)** 
-7.128 
(2.967)** 
-10.231 
(3.215)*** 
-6.195 
(3.290)* 
-6.758 
(3.409)** 
Income -0.92E-3 (0.47E-3)* 
-0.57E-3 
(0.34E-3) 
-0.79E-3 
(0.32E-3)** 
-0.79E-3 
(0.33E-3)** 
-0.38E-3 
(0.27E-3) 
-0.38E-3 
(0.27E-3) 
-0.36E-3 
(0.23E-3) 
Population -4.35E-6 (8.04E-6) 
5.62E-6 
(6.95E-6) 
-2.85E-6 
(5.79E-6) 
-2.80E-6 
(5.89E-6) 
-3.90E-6 
(5.46E-6) 
3.16E-6 
(6.81E-6) 
-15.40E-6 
(15.50E-6) 
Fiscal Prefs. 
Factor 1 - - - - - 
-76.430 
(40.519)* - 
Additional 
Controls - - - - - - Included 
Year effects - - - included - - - 
Observations 26 26 286 286 286 275 286 
R2 0.504 0.634 0.566 0.571 0.534 0.565  0.706  
LM Breusch-
Pagan - - - - 726.25*** 630.17*** 293.10*** 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses, adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons. Additional control variables: 
unemployment, demography (young, aged), topography, population density, fraction of industrial area, total roads, 
rental prices, class size primary school, convictions per capita. Constant term not reported. Significance level: * 
0.05<p<0.1, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Own calculations 
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 Table 4: Hypothesis 1 – Auditors and Expenditures (cantonal dataset) 
Cantonal Data: Expenditure regressions 1990 – 2000 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Period 1990 2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 
Estimation 
Method OLS OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS RE RE RE 
Auditor -1036.70 (345.09)*** 
-1086.78 
(447.61)** 
-1041.05 
(320.91)*** 
-1043.44 
(333.21)***
-584.05 
(322.43)* 
-511.53 
(308.86)* 
-907.272 
(247.05)***
Local Direct 
Democracy 
-1662.05 
(1440.66) 
-2138.94 
(1329.52) 
-2869.15 
(1298.70)** 
-2907.28 
(1328.25)**
-2594.29 
(1745.39) 
-2387.71 
(1352.42)* 
-1643.28 
(1148.01) 
Cantonal Direct 
Democracy 
-221.89 
(370.08) 
224.41 
(480.66) 
218.47 
(361.82) 
239.13 
(371.38) 
-580.64 
(311.59)* 
-688.86 
(320.32)** 
-255.07 
(228.90) 
Decentralization -988.99 (598.71) 
-1387.37 
(575.10)** 
-1143.44 
(507.76)** 
-1156.28 
(524.62)** 
-71.85 
(540.37) 
-224.29 
(486.54) 
-719.75 
(380.69)* 
Income 0.157 (0.061)** 
0.137 
(0.037)*** 
0.136 
(0.030)*** 
0.136 
(0.033)*** 
0.060 
(0.010)*** 
0.061 
(0.010)*** 
0.041 
(0.014)*** 
Population -0.59E-3 (1.58E-3) 
0.16E-3 
(0.91E-3) 
0.02E-3 
(0.94E-3) 
0.02E-3 
(0.96E-3) 
1.27E-3 
(1.03E-3) 
0.47E-3 
(1.25E-3) 
1.62E-3 
(1.14E-3) 
Topography 106.95 (27.57)*** 
148.27 
(33.55)*** 
109.98 
(25.20)*** 
110.45 
(25.63)*** 
57.16 
(38.02) 
51.57 
(21.26)** 
95.45 
(25.99)*** 
Fiscal Prefs. 
Factor 3 - - - - - 
4012.28 
(2146.99)* - 
Additional 
Controls - - - - - - included 
Year effects - - - included - - - 
Observations 26 26 286 286 286 275 286 
R2 0.763 0.804 0.725 0.739 0.603 0.717  0.846 
LM Breusch-
Pagan - - - - 904.52*** 820.12*** 469.30*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, adjusted to clustering in panel estimates. Additional 
control variables: unemployment, demography (young, aged), topography, population density, fraction of industrial 
area, total roads, rental prices, class size primary school, convictions per capita, Uri dummy. Constant term not 
reported. Significance level: * 0.05<p<0.1, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Own calculations 
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 Table 5: Hypothesis 2 – Auditors’ influence in large vs. small jurisdictions (municipal data) 
Hypothesis 2: Municipal dataset, OLS and WLS estimates with interaction term 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 OLS Tax 
OLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
WLS 
Tax 
Auditor -0.604 (0.078)*** 
-0.498 
(0.094)*** 
-0.483 
(0.114)*** 
-0.377 
(0.133)*** 
-0.327 
(0.098)*** 
Interaction term: 
Auditor*Population - 
-2.10E-5 
(1.34E-5) - 
-2.42E-5 
(1.21E-5)* 
-2.52E-5 
(1.18E-5)** 
Local Direct 
Democracy 
1.261 
(0.248)*** 
1.285 
(0.244)*** 
1.349 
(0.227)*** 
1.366 
(0.226)*** 
1.039 
(0.271)*** 
Cantonal Direct 
Democracy 
0.058 
(0.106) 
0.049 
(0.104) 
0.016 
(0.133) 
0.023 
(0.127) 
-0.064 
(0.113) 
Decentralization -1.213 (0.241)*** 
-1.215 
(0.236)*** 
-1.150 
(0.160)*** 
-1.168 
(0.158)*** 
-1.176 
(0.199)*** 
Income -0.080 (0.012)*** 
-0.077 
(0.011)*** 
-0.096 
(0.015)*** 
-0.091 
(0.013)*** 
-0.061 
(0.021)*** 
Population 1.59E-6 (3.63E-6) 
2.47E-6 
(3.95E-6) 
4.01E-6 
(3.97E-6) 
4.97E-6 
(4.19E-6) 
3.19E-6 
(3.61E-6)** 
Additional controls - - - - included 
Observations 732 732 732 732 718 
R2 0.712 0.717 0.664 0.670 0.744 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses, adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons. Additional controls: 
Population squared, demography (aged, young), unemployment, tertiary education, share of foreigners, 
mountainous area, agricultural area, industrial area, public transportation, party support for social democrats. 
Weight: Inverse probability of being included in sample. Significance level: * 0.05<p<0.1, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. Source: Own calculations 
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 Table 6: Causality – 2SLS regressions with municipal and cantonal dataset 
Causality: 2SLS regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Second stage regression 
Dependent Var. Taxes (municipal data) 1999 
Taxes (cantonal data) 
1990 – 2000 
Expenditures (cantonal data) 
1990 – 2000 
Auditor -1.116 (0.309)*** 
-1.361 
(0.654)** 
-9.615 
(5.701) 
-12.520 
(5.766)** 
-580.503 
(1054.62) 
-2505.35 
(1453.32)* 
Local Direct 
Democracy 
2.002 
(0.612)*** 
2.154 
(1.275) 
4.206 
(14.882) 
10.798 
(14.593) 
-3648.886 
(2005.76)* 
-1266.657 
(2034.70) 
Cant. Direct 
Democracy 
0.257 
(0.227) 
0.536 
(0.448) 
0.457 
(3.642) 
2.078 
(3.644) 
116.547 
(411.50) 
799.264 
(623.41) 
Decentralization -1.412 (0.311)*** 
-1.530 
(0.387)*** 
-7.340 
(3.977)* 
-11.347 
(4.453)** 
-864.235 
(772.08) 
-1682.382 
(762.28)** 
Income -0.036 (0.025) 
-0.72E-3 
(0.05) 
-0.77E-3 
(0.34E-3)** 
-0.37E-3 
(0.35E-3) 
0.114 
(0.060)* 
0.160 
(0.053)*** 
Population 4.83E-7 (3.44E-6) 
-5.36E-7 
(5.09E-6) 
-2.72E-6 
(4.71E-6) 
-13.00E-6 
(16.4E-6) 
-0.17E-3 
(0.89E-3) 
6.2E-3 
(2.14E-3)*** 
Topography - - - - 97.092 (34.64)*** 
134.902 
(49.28)** 
Additional 
Controls - included - Included - included 
Observations 730 718 286 286 286 286 
R2 0.614 0.551 0.565 0.610 0.707 0.677  
Instruments: First stage regression 
Nbr. of neighbors 0.050 (0.022)** 
0.079 
(0.026)*** 
0.192 
(0.035)*** 
0.218 
(0.037)*** 
0.174 
(0.042)*** 
0.198 
(0.041)*** 
Cantonal size 
(km2) 
-2.13E-4 
(2.83E-5)*** 
-1.82E-4 
(2.93E-5)*** 
-3.49E-4 
(0.68E-4)*** 
-4.07E-4 
(1.03E-4)*** 
-3.39E-4 
(0.73E-4)*** 
-4.27E-4 
(1.08E-4)*** 
Topography -1.056 (0.468)** 
0.824 
(0.651) 
0.083 
(0.012)*** 
0.087 
(0.017)*** - - 
F-Test 27.16 14.25 20.42 15.46 12.62 13.52 
J-Test  
(p-value) 
0.685 
(0.71) 
3.197 
(0.20) 
2.704 
(0.26) 
36.271 
(0.00)*** 
24.253 
(0.00)*** 
1.616 
(0.20) 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses, adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons.  Additional controls 
municipal data: unemployment, demography (aged, young), tertiary education, public transportation. Additional 
controls cantonal data: unemployment, demography (young, aged), total roads, class size primary school, 
convictions per capita, Uri dummy (included in all expenditure regressions). Constant term not reported. 
Significance level: * 0.05<p<0.1, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Own calculations 
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 Table 7: Additional evidence: Revenue, Deficits, Migration, Income distribution 
Additional Evidence: Revenue, Deficits, Migration and Income distribution 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Revenues  
(1990 – 2000) 
Cantonal data 
Deficits  
(1990 – 2000) 
Cantonal data 
Migration  
(1999) 
Local data 
Income GINI  
(1999) 
Local data 
 RE RE RE RE WLS WLS WLS WLS 
Auditor -801.90 (378.63)** 
-923.68 
(267.40)*** 
-16.70  
(65.37) 
-128.44  
(73.64)* 
1.619 
(0.175)*** 
1.732 
(0.199)*** 
-9.95E-3 
(5.67E-3)*
-9.09E-3 
(3.53E-3)**
Local Direct 
Democracy 
-587.96 
(1589.95) 
-1913.53 
(1145.13)* 
-713.18 
(391.97)* 
-547.84 
(446.38) 
0.421 
(0.651) 
-0.305 
(0.934) 
-1.33E-3 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
Cant. Direct 
Democracy 
-803.76 
(465.43)* 
-409.54 
(300.58) 
51.90 
(107.23) 
327.82 
(117.41)***
-1.571 
(0.228)*** 
-1.125 
(0.349)*** 
-9.25E-3 
(6.80E-3) 
-1.12E-3 
(7.55E-3) 
Decentrali-
zation 
-278.58 
(584.04) 
-958.44 
(444.50)** 
-2.72 
(136.41) 
65.36 
(100.39) 
-0.564 
(0.794) 
0.091 
(0.677) 
9.22E-3 
(0.164) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
Income 0.13 (0.015)*** 
0.06 
(0.019)*** 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
-0.077 
(0.013) 
0.117 
(0.043)** 
-0.167 
(0.095)* 
3.44E-3 
(0.84E-3)***
1.11E-3 
(0.87E-3) 
Population 1.62E-3 (1.21E-3) 
2.33E-3 
(1.63E-3) 
0.11E-3 
(0.19E-3) 
0.54E-3 
(0.50E-3) 
-2.70E-5 
(1.43E-5)*
1.13E-5 
(1.06E-5) 
0.98E-7 
(1.87E-7) 
1.30E-7 
(1.34E-7) 
Topography 79.05 (42.02)* 
127.08 
(17.64)*** - - - - - - 
Additional 
Controls - included - Included - Included - included 
Obs. 286 286 286 286 728 718 732 718 
R2 0.574 0.815 0.064 0.364 0.125 0.283 0.263  0.512 
LM Breusch-
Pagan 671.82*** 273.87*** 12.48*** 5.88** - - - - 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses, adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons. Additional controls cantonal 
data: unemployment, demography (young, aged), population density, industrial area, total roads, class size 
primary school, convictions per capita, rental prices, Uri dummy (in the revenue regressions). Additional controls 
municipal data: Population squared, demography (aged, young), unemployment, tertiary education, share of 
foreigners, mountainous area, agricultural area, industrial area, public transportation, party support for social 
democrats. Constant term not reported. Weight: Inverse probability of being included in sample. Significance level: 
* 0.05<p<0.1, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Own calculations  
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 Table 8: Empirical evidence – The big picture 
 Taxes Expenditures Revenues Deficits Income GINI Immigration 
Auditor ↓ ↓ ↓ (↓) ↓ ↑ 
Local direct 
democracy ↑ (↓) (↓) (↓) → → 
Cantonal direct 
democracy → (↓) ↓ ↑ (↓) ↓ 
Decentralization ↓ ↓ ↓ → → → 
Notes: ↓: consistently estimated negative and (mostly) significant effect; ↑: consistently estimated positive 
and (mostly) significant effect; →: inconsistent and insignificant effect; (): mostly consistent effect, but often 
not or only marginally significant. Source: Own representation  
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